MURPHY v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) 119 S.Ct. 2133
VAUGHN L. MURPHY, PETITIONER v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-1992.
Argued April 27, 1999
Decided June 22, 1999
Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), hired petitioner
as a mechanic, a position that required him to drive commercial
vehicles. To drive, he had to satisfy certain Department of
Transportation (DOT) health certification requirements, including
having "no current clinical diagnosis of high blood pressure
likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial
vehicle safely." 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(6). Despite
petitioner's high blood pressure, he was erroneously granted
certification and commenced work. After the error was
discovered, respondent fired him on the belief that his blood
pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements. Petitioner brought
suit under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), the District Court granted respondent summary judgment,
and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Citing its decision in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893,
902, aff'd, ante, p. 489, that an individual claiming a
disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any
mitigating or corrective measures employed, the Court of Appeals
held that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because
his doctor testified that when medicated, petitioner functions
normally in everyday activities. The court also affirmed the
District Court's determination that petitioner is not "regarded
as"
Page 517
disabled under the ADA, explaining that respondent did not
terminate him on an unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a
heart attack or stroke, but because his blood pressure exceeded
the DOT's requirements for commercial vehicle drivers.
Held:
1. Under the ADA, the determination of whether petitioner's
impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life
activities is made with reference to the mitigating measures he
employs. Sutton, ante, p. 471. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood
pressure does not substantially limit him in any major life
activity. Because the question whether petitioner is
disabled when taking medication is not before this Court,
there is no occasion here to consider whether he is
"disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his
medication or the negative side effects of his medication. P. 521.
2. Petitioner is not "regarded as" disabled because of his high
blood pressure. Under Sutton, ante, at 489, a person is
"regarded as" disabled within the ADA's meaning if, among other
things, a covered entity mistakenly believes that the person's
actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more
major life activities. Here, respondent argues that it does not
regard petitioner as substantially limited in the major life
activity of working, but, rather, regards him as unqualified to
work as a UPS mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health
certification. When referring to the major life activity of
working, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
defines "substantially limits" as "significantly restricted in
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630(j)(3)(i).
Thus, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular
job. Assuming without deciding that the EEOC regulations are
valid, the Court concludes that the evidence that petitioner
is regarded as unable to meet the DOT regulations is not
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs
utilizing his skills. At most, petitioner has shown that he is
regarded as unable to perform the job of mechanic only when that
job requires driving a commercial motor vehicle  a
specific type of vehicle used on a highway in interstate
commerce. He has put forward no evidence that he is regarded as
unable to perform any mechanic job that does not call for driving
a commercial motor vehicle and thus does not require DOT
certification. Indeed, it is undisputed that he is generally
employable as a mechanic, and there is uncontroverted evidence
that he could perform a number of mechanic jobs. Consequently,
petitioner has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to
perform a class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence
demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to
perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter
of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. Pp. 521-525.
141 F.3d 1185, affirmed.
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and
GINSBURG, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BREYER, J., joined, post, p. 518.
Stephen R. McAllister argued the cause for petitioner. With him
on the briefs was Kirk W. Lowry.
James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States et al. as
amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the
Page 518
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney
General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Underwood, Jessica
Dunsay Silver, Seth M. Galanter, C. Gregory Stewart, Philip B.
Sklover, and Carolyn L. Wheeler.
William J. Kilberg argued the cause for respondnet. With him on the
brief were Thomas G. Hungar, Brian J. Finucane, and James R.
Holland II.[fn*]
[fn*] Briefs of amici curae urging reversal were filed for the state
of Massachusetts et al. by Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of
Massachusetts, Catherine C. Ziehl, Assistant Attorney General, Darrell
V. McGraw, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Mary C, Buchmelter,
Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their
respective States as follows; Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Bill
Lockyer of California, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Alan G. Lance of
Idaho, Hames E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla H. Stovall of Kansas, Hoseph
P. Mazurek of Montana, and Patricia A. Madrid of New Mexico; for the
American Diabetes Association by Michael A. Greene; for the National
Employment Lawyers Association by Gary Phelan and Paul A. Brantner;
and for Senator Harkin er al. by Arlene B. Mayerson.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the
American Trucking Association er al. by James D. Holzhauer, Timothy
S. Bishop, Robert Digges, Han Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the
Equal Employment Advisory Council et al. by Ann Elizabeth Reesman,
Corrie L. Fishel, Stephen A. Bokat, Robin S. COnrad, and J. Walker
Henry; and for the society for Human Resource Management by Peter
J. Peresch, Thomas J. Walsh, Jr., Timothy S. Bland, and David S.
Harvey, Jr.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), dismissed
petitioner Vaughn L. Murphy from his job as a UPS mechanic
because of his high blood pressure. Petitioner filed suit under
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or
Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., in
Federal District Court. The District Court granted summary
judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. We must decide whether the Court of Appeals
correctly considered petitioner in his medicated state when it
held that petitioner's impairment does
Page 519
not "substantially limi[t]" one or more of his major life
activities and whether it correctly determined that petitioner
is not "regarded as disabled." See § 12102(2). In light of our decision in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., ante, p. 471, we conclude
that the Court of Appeals' resolution of both issues was correct.
I
Petitioner was first diagnosed with hypertension (high blood
pressure) when he was 10 years old. Unmedicated,
his blood pressure is approximately 250/160. With medication,
however, petitioner's "hypertension does not significantly
restrict his activities and . . . in general he can function
normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally
do." 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (Kan. 1996) (discussing testimony of
petitioner's physician).
In August 1994, respondent hired petitioner as a mechanic, a
position that required petitioner to drive commercial motor
vehicles. Petitioner does not challenge the District Court's
conclusion that driving a commercial motor vehicle is an
essential function of the mechanic's job at UPS. Id.,
at 882-883. To drive such vehicles, however, petitioner had to
satisfy certain health requirements imposed by the Department of
Transportation (DOT). 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a) (1998) ("A person
shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is
physically qualified to do so and . . . has on his/her
person . . . a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is
physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle"). One
such requirement is that the driver of a commercial motor vehicle
in interstate commerce have "no current clinical diagnosis of
high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to
operate a commercial vehicle safely." § 391.41(b)(6).
At the time respondent hired him, petitioner's blood pressure
was so high, measuring at 186/124, that he was not qualified for
DOT health certification, see App. 98a-102a (Department of
Transportation, Medical Regulatory Criteria for Evaluation Under
Section 391.41(b)(6), attached as exhibit to
Page 520
Affidavit and Testimony of John R. McMahon) (hereinafter Medical Regulatory
Criteria). Nonetheless, petitioner was erroneously granted
certification, and he commenced work. In September 1994, a UPS
medical supervisor who was reviewing petitioner's medical files
discovered the error and requested that petitioner have his blood
pressure retested. Upon retesting, petitioner's
blood pressure was measured at 160/102 and 164/104. See App. 48a
(testimony of Vaughn Murphy). On October 5, 1994, respondent
fired petitioner on the belief that his blood pressure exceeded
the DOT's requirements for drivers of commercial motor vehicles.
Petitioner brought suit under Title I of the ADA in the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas. The court
granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. It held that,
to determine whether petitioner is disabled under the ADA, his
"impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state."
946 F. Supp., at 881. Noting that when petitioner is medicated he is
inhibited only in lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions
normally, the court held that petitioner is not "disabled" under
the ADA. Id., at 881-882. The court also rejected
petitioner's claim that he was "regarded as" disabled, holding
that respondent "did not regard Murphy as disabled, only that he
was not certifiable under DOT regulations." Id., at
882.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment.
141 F.3d 1185 (CA10 1999) (judgt. order). Citing its decision in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (CA10
1997), aff'd, ante, at 471, that an individual claiming a
disability under the ADA should be assessed with regard to any
mitigating or corrective measures employed, the court held
that petitioner's hypertension is not a disability because his
doctor had testified that when petitioner is medicated, he
"`functions normally doing everyday activity that an everyday
person does.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. The court also
affirmed the District Court's determination that petitioner is
not "regarded as" disabled under the ADA. It
Page 521
explained that respondent did not terminate petitioner "on an
unsubstantiated fear that he would suffer a heart attack or
stroke," but "because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's
requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles." Id., at 5a.
We granted certiorari, 525 U.S. 1063 (1999), and we now affirm.
II
The first question presented in this case is whether the
determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference
to the mitigating measures he employs. We have answered that
question in Sutton in the affirmative. Given that
holding, the result in this case is clear. The Court of Appeals
concluded that, when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure
does not substantially limit him in any major life activity.
Petitioner did not seek, and we did not grant, certiorari on
whether this conclusion was correct. Because the question
whether petitioner is disabled when taking medication is not
before us, we have no occasion here to consider whether
petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite
his medication or the negative side effects of his medication.
Instead, the question granted was limited to whether, under the
ADA, the determination of whether an individual's impairment
"substantially limits" one or more major life activities should
be made without consideration of mitigating measures.
Consequently, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in respondent's favor on
the claim that petitioner is substantially limited in one or more
major life activities and thus disabled under the ADA.
III
The second issue presented is also largely resolved by our
opinion in Sutton. Petitioner argues that the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that he is not "regarded as" disabled
because of his high blood pressure. As we held in
Sutton, ante, at 489, a person is "regarded as" disabled within the
Page 522
meaning of the ADA if a covered entity mistakenly believes
that the person's actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities. Here, petitioner
alleges that his hypertension is regarded as substantially
limiting him in the major life activity of working, when in
fact it does not. To support this claim, he points to
testimony from respondent's resource manager that respondent
fired petitioner due to his hypertension, which he claims
evidences respondent's belief that petitioner's hypertension â€â€
and consequent inability to obtain DOT certification â€â€
substantially limits his ability to work. In response,
respondent argues that it does not regard petitioner as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working
but, rather, regards him as unqualified to work as a UPS
mechanic because he is unable to obtain DOT health certification.
As a preliminary matter, we note that there remains some
dispute as to whether petitioner meets the requirements for DOT
certification. As discussed above, petitioner was incorrectly
granted DOT certification at his first examination when he should
have instead been found unqualified. See supra, at 519-520.
Upon retesting, although petitioner's blood pressure was not low
enough to qualify him for the 1 year certification that he had
incorrectly been issued, it was sufficient to qualify him for
optional temporary DOT health certification. App. 98a-102a
(Medical Regulatory Criteria). Had a physician examined
petitioner and, in light of his medical history, declined to
issue a temporary DOT certification, we would not second-guess
that decision. Here, however, it appears that UPS determined
that petitioner could not meet the DOT standards and did not
allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary
certification. Id., at 84a-86a (testimony of Monica
Sloan, UPS' company nurse); id., at 54a-55a (testimony
and affidavit of Vaughn Murphy). We need not resolve the
question whether petitioner could meet the standards for DOT
health certification, however, as it goes only to whether
petitioner is qualified
Page 523
and whether respondent has a defense based on the DOT regulations, see
Albertsons's Inc., v. Kirkingburg, post, p. 555, issues not addressed
by the court below or raised in the petition for certiorari.
The only issue remaining is whether the evidence that
petitioner is regarded as unable to obtain DOT certification
(regardless of whether he can, in fact, obtain optional temporary
certification) is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as
substantially limited in one or more major life activities. As
in Sutton, ante, at 491-492, we assume, arguendo,
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissions EEOC regulations
regarding the disability determination are valid. When referring
to the major life activity of working, the EEOC defines
"substantially limits" as: "significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998). The EEOC further
identifies several factors that courts should consider when
determining whether an individual is substantially limited in
the major life activity of working, including "the number and
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
abilities, within [the] geographical area [reasonably
accessible to the individual], from which the individual is
also disqualified." § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). Thus, to be
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity
of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a
particular job. See § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) ("The inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working").
Again, assuming without deciding that these regulations are
valid, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is regarded as
disabled. Petitioner was fired from the position of UPS
mechanic because he has a physical impairment  hypertension
Page 524
 that is regarded as preventing him from obtaining DOT health
certification. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a (UPS terminated
Murphy because "his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's
requirements for drivers of commercial vehicles");
946 F. Supp., at 882 ("[T]he court concludes UPS did not regard
Murphy as disabled, only that he was not certifiable under DOT
regulations"); App. 125a, ¶ 18 (Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment) ("UPS considers
driving commercial motor vehicles an essential function of
plaintiff's job as mechanic"); id. at 103a (testimony of John R.
McMahon) (stating that the reason why petitioner was fired was
that he "did not meet the requirements of the Department of
Transportation").
The evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to meet the
DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to
perform a class of jobs utilizing his skills. At most,
petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform the
job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a commercial
motor vehicle  a specific type of vehicle used on a
highway in interstate commerce. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 (1998) (defining
"commercial motor vehicle" as a vehicle weighing over 10,000
pounds, designed to carry 16 or more passengers, or used in the
transportation of hazardous materials). Petitioner has put
forward no evidence that he is regarded as unable to perform any
mechanic job that does not call for driving a commercial motor
vehicle and thus does not require DOT certification. Indeed, it
is undisputed that petitioner is generally employable as a
mechanic. Petitioner has "performed mechanic jobs that did not
require DOT certification" for "over 22 years," and he secured
another job as a mechanic shortly after leaving UPS.
946 F. Supp., at 875, 876. Moreover, respondent presented
uncontroverted evidence that petitioner could perform jobs
such as diesel mechanic, automotive mechanic, gas-engine repairer, and
Page 525
gas-welding equipment mechanic, all of which utilize
petitioner's mechanical skills. See App. 115a (report of Lewis Vierling).
Consequently, in light of petitioner's skills and the array of
jobs available to petitioner utilizing those skills, petitioner
has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a
class of jobs. Rather, the undisputed record evidence
demonstrates that petitioner is, at most, regarded as unable to
perform only a particular job. This is insufficient, as a matter
of law, to prove that petitioner is regarded as substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. See Sutton,
ante, at 492-493. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly
granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on petitioner's
claim that he is regarded as disabled. For the reasons stated,
we affirm the judgement of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., ante, at 495, I respectfully
dissent. I believe that petitioner has a "disability" within
the meaning of the ADA because, assuming petitioner's
uncontested evidence to be true, his very severe hypertension
 in its unmedicated state  "substantially limits" his
ability to perform several major life activities. Without
medication, petitioner would likely be hospitalized. See App.
81. Indeed, unlike Sutton, this case scarcely requires us to
speculate whether Congress intended the Act to cover
individuals with this impairment. Severe hypertension, in my
view, easily falls within the ADA's nucleus of covered
impairments. See Sutton, ante, at 496-503 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
Because the Court of Appeals did not address whether
petitioner was qualified or whether he could perform the
essential job functions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, I would
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Page 526
